

Edition 1.0 2023-02

# TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION



Safety of machinery – Guidelines on functional safety of safety-related control system

INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION

ICS 13.110; 29.020; 25.040.99

ISBN 978-2-8322-6533-8

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### CONTENTS

FC	DREWO	RD	9
IN	TRODU	CTION	11
1	Scop	e	12
2	Norm	ative references	12
3	Term	s and definitions	13
	3.1	Terms and definitions	
	3.2	Alphabetical list of terms, definitions and abbreviated terms	
4		al classification of safety functions in safety of machinery	
	4.1	General	
	4.1.1	Overview	
	4.1.2		
	4.1.3		
	4.1.4		
	4.2	Basic safety assumptions for the design and integration of the SCS or	
		SRP/CS	
	4.3	Safety functions	
	4.3.1	General	
	4.3.2	, ,	
	4.3.3	Typical classification of safety functions	
	4.4	Interrelation between ISO 12100 and IEC 62061 or ISO 13849-1	
	4.4.1	General	
	4.4.2	1	
	4.4.3	•	
	4.5 4.5.1	Safety functions for protection of persons	
	4.5.1 4.5.2	Safety functions for protection of persons based on guards and	34
	4.5.2	protective devices	34
	4.6	Other safety functions to prevent hazardous situations	
	4.6.1	General	
	4.6.2	Other safety functions	35
	4.7	Safety functions for protection of the integrity of the machine	36
	4.7.1	General	36
	4.7.2	Safety functions for the protection of integrity of the machine	36
	4.8	Safety functions and Type-C standards	
5	Dema	and mode of operation related to safety functions	37
	5.1	General	37
	5.2	High demand or continuous mode of operation	37
	5.2.1	General	
	5.2.2	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	
	5.2.3	Rarely activated safety functions	
	5.3	Low demand mode of operation	
	5.3.1	General	
_	5.3.2	1.1	
6		gn process of safety functions	
	6.1	General	
	6.2	Design procedure	
	6.3	Evaluation of required safety integrity	41

	6.4	Decomposition of a safety function	41
	6.5	Subsystem design	41
	6.5.1	Architectural constraints	41
	6.5.2	Fault accumulation and undetected faults	43
	6.5.3	Evaluation of PFH	43
	6.6	Examples of safety functions	
7	Verifi	cation procedures for safety functions	45
	7.1	General	45
	7.2	Verification of the test interval of a safety function	45
	7.3	Verification procedures	46
	7.4	Initial verification	46
	7.5	Periodic verification	47
	7.5.1	General	47
	7.5.2	Frequency of periodic verification	48
	7.6	Verification reporting	49
Ar	nnex A (	informative) Risk assessment and risk reduction according to ISO 12100	50
	A.1	General	50
	A.2	Risk assessment principles	50
	A.2.1	General	50
	A.2.2	Basic information to be available (as input to risk assessment)	50
	A.2.3		
	A.3	Risk reduction by means of safeguarding and complementary protective	
		measures	55
	A.3.1		
	A.3.2	, 3	
	A.3.3	9 9 1 71	
	A.4	Other protective measures (procedure based)	58
	A.4.1		
	A.4.2		
	A.4.3	9	
	A.5	Guards and protective devices according to ISO 12100	
	A.5.1		
	A.5.2	,	
	A.5.3	3	
	A.5.4	,	
	A.5.5		
	A.5.6	, ,	
	A.5.7	,	
	A.6	Matrix assignment approach	
	A.6.1		
	A.6.2		
	A.6.3	,	
	A.7	Risk graph approach	
	A.7.1		
	A.7.2	,	
Ar	nnex B (	informative) Methodology of SCS or SRP/CS design	
	B.1	General	
	B.2	Functional safety plan	
	B.3	Safety requirements specification	66

B.3.1	General	66
B.3.2	Functional requirements	66
B.3.3	Safety integrity requirements	66
B.4	Protection against unexpected start-up	67
B.5	Decomposition of the safety function	67
B.5.1	General	67
B.5.2	Subsystem architecture based on top-down decomposition	67
B.6	Design of the SCS by using subsystems	67
B.7	Requirements for systematic safety integrity	68
B.7.1	General	68
B.7.2	SCS level	68
B.7.3	Subsystem level	70
B.8	Electromagnetic immunity	
B.9	Software-based manual parameterization	
B.10	Security aspects	
B.11	Aspects of testing	
B.12	Design and development of a subsystem	
B.12.	·	
B.12.		
B.12.	•	
B.12.		
B.12.		
B.12.		
	Validation	
B.14	Documentation	
	informative) Examples of MTTF <sub>D</sub> values for single components	
	<del>-</del>	
Annex D (	informative) Examples for diagnostic coverage (DC)	
D.1	General	
D.2	Influence of cabling, wiring and interconnections	
D.2.1		
D.2.2	"Serial wiring"	85
D.3	Use of manufacturing process information	
D.3.1		
D.3.2	<del>-</del>	
D.4	Typical DC measures	86
	informative) Measures for the achievement of functional safety with regards	88
E.1	General	88
E.2	Measures	88
E.2.1	General	88
E.2.2	Recommendation for electrical/electronic items of equipment (devices or apparatus)	88
E.2.3	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	
	electrical equipment of the machine	89
Annex F (	informative) Guidelines for software	90
F.1	General	90
F.2	Documentation	
F.3	Activities	
Annex G (	informative) Examples of safety functions	
`	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	

G.1	General	97
G.2	Safety functions	97
G.2.1	Basic information	97
G.2.2	Detailed description of safety requirements	98
G.2.3	Example of interlocking guard	99
Annex H (	informative) Evaluation of PFH value of a subsystem	101
H.1	General	101
H.2	Table allocation approach (IEC 62061)	101
H.3	Simplified formulas for the estimation of PFH value (IEC 62061)	
H.4	Approaches of IEC 61508, IEC 62061 and ISO 13849-1	
H.4.1		
H.4.2	Approach of IEC 61508	102
H.4.3	Approach of IEC 62061	103
H.4.4	Approach of ISO 13849-1:2015, Annex K	103
H.5	Basic considerations regarding exponential and Weibull distributions	107
H.5.1	Exponential distribution	107
H.5.2	Weibull distribution	107
H.6	$T_{10}$ and $B_{10}$	109
H.6.1	General	109
H.6.2	$T_{10}$ with exponential distribution	109
H.6.3	T <sub>10</sub> with Weibull distribution	110
H.7	Overview of PFH formulas	112
H.7.1	Definitions	112
H.7.2	Formulas	112
H.7.3	Examples	114
H.8	Methodology for the estimation of CCF	116
H.9	Basic subsystem architecture A (1001)	117
H.9.1	General	117
H.9.2	PFH	118
H.9.3	Simplified Weibull approach	118
H.10	Basic subsystem architecture C (1001D)	119
H.10.	1 General	119
H.10.	2 Fault reaction performed by another subsystem	119
H.10.	3 Fault reaction to be considered in the subsystem	120
H.10.	4 PFH	122
H.10.	5 Influence of CCF	122
H.11	Basic subsystem architecture B (1002)	123
H.11.	1 General	123
H.11.	2 PFH	124
H.11.	3 Influence of CCF	124
H.12	Basic subsystem architecture D (1002D)	
H.12.	1 General	124
H.12.	2 PFH evaluation of Term A	126
H.12.	3 PFH evaluation of Term B	126
H.12.	4 PFH evaluation of Term C and Term D	126
H.12.	5 PFH	127
H 12	6 Influence of CCF	127

H.13	Basic subsystem architecture D (1002D) with two periods of time consideration	127
H.13.		
	nformative) Commented examples of current regulations	
I.1	General	130
1.2	European Union	
1.2.1	General European legislation	130
1.2.2	New proposed machinery regulation (under preparation)	130
1.2.3	Relevant legislation	131
1.2.4	Duties of the manufacturer of the machine	131
1.3	North America – USA	132
1.4	North America – Canada	
1.5	South America - Brazil	
1.6	China	
1.7	Japan	
Annex J (i	informative) Combination of modes of operation	
J.1	General	
J.2	Basic approaches with different modes of operation	
J.2.1		
J.2.2	·	
J.3	Use of subsystems in different modes of operation	
J.3.1	General	
J.3.2 J.3.3	·	
	Subsystem(s) used for different modes of operation	
Dibliograp	····y	141
Figure 1 -	- Integration within the risk reduction process of ISO 12100	29
_	- Decomposition of an SCS or SRP/CS	
	- Risk reduction process by safety functions	
_	- High demand mode of operation	
•	•	
_	- Process for determining high demand mode of operation	
_	1 – SIL assignment approach	
•		
•	2 – Risk graph approach of ISO 13849-1:2015, Figure A.1 with assigned SIL.	
•	1 – Example of decomposition of a safety function	68
	2 – Possible effects of security risk(s) to a SCS 3074:2019, Figure 2)	73
Figure B.3	B – Rarely activated safety functions and mode of operation of subsystems	76
Figure H.	1 – Cumulative distribution functions (CDF)	111
Figure H.2	2 – Common cause failure	117
Figure H.3	3 – Basic subsystem architecture A (1001) reliability block diagram	117
_	4 – Unavailability function of basic subsystem architecture A (1001)	

Figure H.5 – 1001 reliability block diagram, simplified Weibull approach	118
Figure H.6 – Basic subsystem architecture C (1oo1D) logical view with safe state initiation using another subsystem	119
Figure H.7 – Basic subsystem architecture C (1oo1D) reliability block diagram with safe state initiation using another subsystem	119
Figure H.8 – Unavailability functions of basic subsystem architecture C (10o1D)	120
Figure H.9 – Basic subsystem architecture C (10o1D) logical view with fault reaction	120
Figure H.10 – Basic subsystem architecture C (1oo1D) reliability block diagram with fault reaction	121
Figure H.11 – Unavailability functions of basic subsystem architecture C (10o1D)	121
Figure H.12 – Basic subsystem architecture B (1002) reliability block diagram	123
Figure H.13 – Unavailability functions of basic subsystem architecture B (1002)	123
Figure H.14 – Basic subsystem architecture D (10o2D) reliability block diagram	125
Figure H.15 – Unavailability functions of basic subsystem architecture D (10o2D)	125
Figure J.1 – Basic approach in high demand or continuous mode of operation based on IEC 61508 (and IEC 62061)	134
Figure J.2 – Basic approach in low demand mode of operation based on IEC 61508 (and IEC 61511)	135
Figure J.3 – Functional view	137
Figure J.4 – Logical view	137
Figure J.5 – Decomposition view	138
Figure J.6 – Quantitative SIL evaluation using the approach of ratio of probability of failures of each subsystem	139
Figure J.7 – Example of quantitative SIL evaluation using the approach of ratio of probability of failures of each subsystem	140
Table 1 – Terms used in this document	26
Table 2 – Input information for the safety requirements specification (SRS)	33
Table 3 – Output information from SCS or SRP/CS design on overall risk assessment $\dots$	33
Table 4 – Safety functions for protection of persons	34
Table 5 – Other safety functions	35
Table 6 – Safety functions for the protection of integrity of the machine	36
Table 7 – Architectural constraints for high demand mode of operation	42
Table A.1 – Basic information for risk assessment according to ISO 12100	51
Table A.2 – Determination of limits of machinery according to ISO 12100	52
Table A.3 – Principles of hazard identification according to ISO 12100	53
Table A.4 – Risk estimation according to ISO 12100	54
Table A.5 – Additional considered aspects during risk estimation according to ISO 12100	54
Table A.6 – Guards according to ISO 12100	59
Table A.7 – Examples of protective devices according to ISO 12100	60
Table B.1 – Overview functional safety plan	65
Table B.2 – Overview of basic functional requirements	66
Table B.3 – SIL and limits of <b>PFH</b> values	67
Table B.4 – Avoidance of systematic failures (SCS or SRP/CS level)	
Table B.4 – Avoidance of systematic failures (303 of 31(F/03 level)	69

Table B.6 – Avoidance of systematic failures (subsystem level)	70
Table B.7 – Control of systematic failures (subsystem level)	71
Table B.8 – Software-based manual parameterization	72
Table B.9 – Cause and effects of rarely activated safety functions	76
Table B.10 – Architectural constraints and basic requirements on a subsystem	77
Table B.11 – Overview of validation process with required information	79
Table B.12 – Technical documentation based on the design process (Table 9 of IEC 62061:2021, modified)	81
Table B.13 – Overview of documentation	82
Table C.1 – MTTF $_{D}$ or $\it B_{10D}$ values for components (derived from ISO 13849-1:2015)	83
Table C.2 – Relationship of $\lambda_D$ , MTTF $_D$ and $B_{10D}$	83
Table D.1 – Measures to prevent of short circuit	85
Table D.2 – DC values and recommended measures	87
Table E.1 – Non-exhaustive list of recommendations regarding EMI measures for integration of devices or equipment into the electrical equipment of the machine	89
Table F.1 – Documents for SW level 1 and SW level 2	90
Table F.2 – Coding guidelines	91
Table F.3 – Overview of protocols	92
Table F.4 – SW level 1 – Overview of basic activities	93
Table F.5 – SW level 2 – Overview of basic activities (1/2)	94
Table F.5 – SW level 2 – Overview of basic activities (1/2) (continued)	95
Table F.6 – SW level 2 – Overview of basic activities (2/2)	96
Table G.1 – Examples of safety functions and associated safety-related devices	97
Table G.2 – Basic information related to the safety requirements specification	98
Table G.3 – Example of safety-related parameters for a safety function with required SIL 1	100
Table G.4 – Example of safety-related parameters for a safety function with required	400
SIL 3	
Table H.1 – Formulas for basic subsystem architecture A (1001)	
Table H.2 – Formulas for basic subsystem architecture C (1001D)	
Table H.3 – Formulas for basic subsystem architecture B (1002)	
Table H.4 – Formulas for basic subsystem architecture D (1002D)	
Table H.5 – Examples of PFH values based on B <sub>10D</sub>	
Table H.6 – Examples of PFH values based on $T_{10D}$ and $B_{10D}$	
Table J.1 – PFD <sub>avg max</sub> and PFH <sub>max</sub> for respective target SIL	140

#### INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION

## SAFETY OF MACHINERY – GUIDELINES ON FUNCTIONAL SAFETY OF SAFETY-RELATED CONTROL SYSTEMS

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The text of this Technical Specification is based on the following documents:

Draft	Report on voting
44/980/DTS	44/989/RVDTS

Full information on the voting for its approval can be found in the report on voting indicated in the above table.

The language used for the development of this Technical Specification is English.

This document was drafted in accordance with ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2, and developed in accordance with ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1 and ISO/IEC Directives, IEC Supplement, available at <a href="https://www.iec.ch/members\_experts/refdocs">www.iec.ch/members\_experts/refdocs</a>. The main document types developed by IEC are described in greater detail at <a href="https://www.iec.ch/standardsdev/publications">www.iec.ch/standardsdev/publications</a>.

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- · reconfirmed,
- · withdrawn,
- replaced by a revised edition, or
- amended.

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#### INTRODUCTION

In the context of the safety of machinery, the sector standard IEC 62061, along with ISO 13849-1, provides requirements and guidance to the manufacturers of machines to design, develop and integrate a safety-related control system (SCS) or safety-related parts of control systems (SRP/CS), respectively, including input devices and final elements whatever the technology (mechanical, pneumatic, hydraulic and electrical technologies).

The following aspects are relevant:

- the classification of safety functions,
- the architecture of the realization of safety functions,
- the modes of operation of safety functions,
- the calculation based on the used technology.

Therefore, safety functions can be classified as follows:

- Safety functions that stop the dangerous movement(s) of the machine and that are mainly performed by SCS or SRP/CS of machines for the protection of persons. Typical examples are interlocking guards, sensitive protective equipment, two-hand control devices and emergency stop.
- Safety functions that protect the integrity of the machine against its destruction and that in a second step can have an impact on the protection of persons. Typical examples are protective devices, devices for limiting pressure or temperature (also defined as "safety-related parameters", e.g. position, speed, temperature or pressure, deviate from limits defined in the control system).
- Other safety functions that are not covered by the two previous cases.

NOTE 1 The different kinds of safety functions are defined and in line with the classifications and definitions of ISO 12100 and ISO 13849-1.

The subsystem architectures to perform safety function(s) are considered.

NOTE 2 In IEC 62061:2021, information is introduced to map SIL (Safety Integrity Level) classification of IEC 62061/IEC 61508 and classification of ISO 13849-1 in terms of categories, architectures, designated architectures and PL (Performance Level). In order to allow backward compatibility, these different criteria are considered in this document.

Depending on the mode of operation of the safety function, criteria and calculations will be considered in order to fulfil the requirements of this document and in order to be in line with existing regulations (e.g. such as recommendations for use in Europe) and other requirements already defined in existing standards, for example on test periodicity.

In order to consider mechanical, pneumatic, hydraulic and electrical technologies, applications for the safety functions, architectures and mode of operation, the associated calculations are evaluated.

NOTE 3 For example, most calculations inside standards are based on the exponential law that is typically applicable to electronic technology. For mechanic or other technologies, Weibull distribution is applied and exponential distribution is not used, except under restrictions.

## SAFETY OF MACHINERY – GUIDELINES ON FUNCTIONAL SAFETY OF SAFETY-RELATED CONTROL SYSTEMS

#### 1 Scope

In the context of the safety of machinery, the sector standard IEC 62061, along with ISO 13849-1, provides requirements to manufacturers of machines for the design, development and integration of safety-related control systems (SCS) or safety-related parts of control systems (SRP/CS), depending on technology used (mechanical, pneumatic, hydraulic or electrical technologies) to perform safety function(s). This document does not replace ISO 13849-1 and IEC 62061. This document gives additional guidance to the application of IEC 62061 or ISO 13849-1. This document:

- gives guidelines and specifies additional requirements for specific safety functions based on the methodology of ISO 12100, which are relevant in machinery and respecting typical boundary conditions of machinery;
- considers safety functions which are designed for high demand mode of operation yet are rarely operated, called rarely activated safety functions;
  - NOTE 1 IEC 62061:2021 completely covers high demand. However, other safety functions related to the protection of the machine itself and indirectly of persons are considered more in detail in this document.
- gives additional information for the calculation of failure rates using other (non-electronic) technologies based e.g. on Weibull distribution, because all the formula defined in IEC 62061 and ISO 13849-1 are based on exponential distribution.

Therefore, the basis for these guidelines and additional requirements is

- a typical classification of safety functions;
- a consideration of typical architectures used for designing safety functions;
- a consideration of modes of operation of safety functions;
- the derivation and evaluation of PFH formulas for subsystems considering the used technology.

NOTE 2 These guidelines can also be used for application of ISO 13849-1 for the design process of SRP/CS.

This document does not address low demand mode of operation according to IEC 61508.

This document does not take into account either layer of protection analysis (LOPA) or basic process control system (BPCS), according to IEC 61511 as a risk reduction measure.

This document considers all lifecycle phases of the machine regarding functional safety, and SCS or SRP/CS.

NOTE 3 The user of the machine needs information from the machine manufacturer for the safe operation of the machine, e.g. useful lifetime of components, maintenance information, testing of safety functions if necessary.

#### 2 Normative references

The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their content constitutes requirements of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

IEC 62061:2021, Safety of machinery – Functional safety of safety-related control systems

IEC TR 63074:2019, Safety of machinery – Security aspects related to functional safety of safety-related control systems

ISO 12100:2010, Safety of machinery – General principles for design – Risk assessment and risk reduction

ISO 13849-1:2015, Safety of machinery – Safety-related parts of control systems – Part 1: General principles for design

ISO 13850:2015, Safety of machinery – Emergency stop function – Principles for design

ISO 13851:2019, Safety of machinery – Two-hand control devices – Principles for design and selection

ISO 14118:2017, Safety of machinery – Prevention of unexpected start-up

ISO 14119:2013, Safety of machinery – Interlocking devices associated with guards – Principles for design and selection